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Abstract
To demarcate the limits of experimental knowledge we probe the limits
of what might be called an experiment. By appeal to examples of scientific
practice from astrophysics and analogue gravity, we demonstrate that the reli-
ability of knowledge regarding certain phenomena gained from an experiment
is not circumscribed by the manipulability or accessibility of the target phe-
nomena. Rather, the limits of experimental knowledge are set by the extent to
which strategies for what we call ‘inductive triangulation’ are available: that
is, the validation of the mode of inductive reasoning involved in the source-
target inference via appeal to one or more distinct and independent modes
of inductive reasoning. When such strategies are able to partially mitigate
reasonable doubt, we can take a theory regarding the phenomena to be well
supported by experiment. When such strategies are able to fully mitigate
reasonable doubt, we can take a theory regarding the phenomena to be estab-
lished by experiment. There are good reasons to expect the next generation
of analogue experiments to provide genuine knowledge of unmanipulable and
inaccessible phenomena such that the relevant theories can be understood as
well supported.
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1 Introduction
It is somewhat of an oversimplification to say that experiments allow us to gain
knowledge about the world. Indeed, an experiment, in and of itself, may not al-
low us to gain any reliable knowledge at all. Consider a measurement of negative
temperature with a faulty digital thermometer or the infamous detection of neu-
trinos moving at superluminal speed at OPERA. In and of itself, an experiment
need not teach us anything useful, even about the system that is being directly
manipulated. For us to gain reliable knowledge from an experiment, it must be the
case that the experiment is validated. Two distinct forms of experimental validation
are differentiated by the object system about which we are justified in believing we
have gained knowledge. An internally valid experiment justifies our beliefs about a
source system, which is directly manipulated in the experiment. An externally valid
experiment justifies our beliefs about a target system, which is not directly manip-
ulated in the experiment.1 Typically the internal validity of a given experiment is
necessary but not sufficient for the external validity of that experiment.
What kinds of target systems can we gain knowledge about? And what factors
place limits on the strength of this knowledge? In particular, must target systems
be, in principle, themselves manipulable? Or should we insist that they are at
1This concept of ‘external validity’ is closely analogous to that used in the social sciences.
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least accessible, in the sense of being subject to possible observation? In this paper
we will argue that the limits of experimental knowledge should not be taken to
be circumscribed by the manipulability or accessibility of target systems. There is
no, in principle, epistemic barrier to experiments with unmanipulable or inaccessible
target systems being externally valid. Experiments in contemporary science can and
do allow us to gain knowledge of unmanipulable and inaccessible target systems. We
will argue that the limits of experimental knowledge are in fact set by the mitigation
of reasonable doubt – that is, the application of inductive strategies for internally
and externally valid source-target inferences. When reasonable doubt has been
partially mitigated, a theory can be said to be well supported, and a scientist is
justified to treat the empirical consequences of the theory as likely to be true, in
the relevant domain. When reasonable doubt has been almost entirely mitigated a
theory can be said to be established, and a scientist is justified to treat the empirical
consequences of the theory as true, in the relevant domain. To demarcate the
limits of experimental knowledge we will probe the limits of what might be called
an experiment. In particular, we will illustrate our arguments by drawing upon
examples from astrophysics and analogue gravity, in the latter case drawing upon
existing philosophical work on the epistemology of analogue black holes (Dardashti
et al., 2017, 2019; The´bault, 2019). Using these examples we will illustrate three
core claims.
Our first core claim is that whether a theory regarding certain phenomena can be
well supported or established by experiment is not constrained by the requirement
that the target system displaying these phenomena be manipulable or accessible,
either in principle or practice. Thus, theories regarding unmanipulable and inac-
cessible phenomena can in principle become established via experiment. We thus
endorse a liberal form of empiricism within which the scope of phenomena about
which we can gain experimental knowledge is much wider than that of either re-
stricted forms of empiricism (Van Fraassen, 1980; Monton and Mohler, 2017) or,
moreover, ‘detectionist’ forms of scientific realism (Azzouni, 2004; Chakravartty,
2007). On our view, the limits of experimental knowledge are set by the extent to
which strategies for inductive triangulation are available: that is, the validation of
the mode of inductive reasoning involved in the source-target inference via appeal
to one or more distinct and independent modes of inductive reasoning. Our view is
thus in direct opposition to the seemingly commonsensical view that the limits of
experimental knowledge are set by what we can observe and manipulate. In order to
convince the reader of our conclusion, we will draw upon a detailed study of infer-
ences involved in contemporary scientific practice. In particular, we will show that
nuclear process in the stellar core provide a vivid example of an unmanipulable and
(at least partially) inaccessible target phenomenon the modern theories of which we
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can take to be uncontroversially established by conventional experiment.
Our second core claim is that an experiment on a manipulable and accessible
source system of a given type can, in some circumstances, be used to make induc-
tive inferences regarding a target system of a different type. In particular, when
we have good reason to believe that the source and target phenomena in question
are ‘universal’, it is possible to make inductive inferences from the existence of the
phenomena in the source system to the existence of the phenomena in the target
system. Such inferences constitute a new form of ‘inter-type’ uniformity principle
which play a structurally similar role within the relevant inductive inference to that
played by more standard uniformity principles (space, time, intra-type) in conven-
tional inductive reasoning. As such, they are amenable to inductive triangulation.
That is, we can justify source-target inferences based upon inter-type uniformity
by appeal to one or more distinct and independent modes of inductive reasoning.
Thus there is nothing in principle that rules out inter-type inductive reasoning from
playing a significant role in inductive triangulation.
One third and final core claim is that analogue gravity experiments instantiate
an example of scientific practice in which a scientist can use inductive triangu-
lation to gain genuine knowledge of inaccessible target phenomena based upon a
highly speculative but structurally sound inductive inference between accessible and
inaccessible systems of different types. In particular, we will show how inductive
triangulation can be applied such that a series of analogue black hole experiments
that exploit multiple different types of source system can be combined with univer-
sality arguments to provide inductive evidence regarding the phenomena of Hawking
radiation in astrophysical black holes. The explicit appeal to inductive triangulation
provides concrete refutation of the claim appearing in the philosophical literature
that ‘analogue experiments are not capable of confirming the existence of particu-
lar phenomena in inaccessible target systems’ (Crowther et al., 2019, p. 1) due to
a supposed ‘circularity’ within the relevant chain of reasoning. These ‘circularity’
arguments will be considered in detail in the final section and it will be shown that
the only plausible reading of ‘circularity’ in the given context is ‘rule circularity’.
This form of circularity arises when one employs an argument to establish a propo-
sition concerning a rule of inference, and the relevant argument-form employed is
an instance of that rule. However, so long as one is not arguing with an inductive
sceptic, inductive triangulation provides precisely the means to deflate such puta-
tive problems with rule-circularity, both in general and in the case of the highly
speculative inferences from analogue gravity experiments to Hawking radiation in
black holes. Inductive triangulation can thus, in principle, be extended as a means
to cross-validate inferences that rely upon both uniformity between accessible and
inaccessible systems and systems of different types.
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There is thus a plausible epistemic basis to believe that the next generation of
analogue experiments may be able to provide genuine knowledge of unmanipulable
and inaccessible phenomena such that the relevant theories can be understood as
well supported. Furthermore, looking further to the future, inductive triangulation
allows for the possibility of analogue experiments to play a role, when combined
with appropriate conventional experimental results, in establishing new theories.
2 Epistemology and Experiment
2.1 Reasonable and Unreasonable Doubt
An ampliative inference is one in which the conclusion goes beyond what is (logi-
cally) entailed by the premises: it is not logically necessary that the conclusion is
true given the truth of the premises. Inductive inferences can be defined as the set
of all inferences that are ampliative.2 Most scientists and philosophers – with the
notable exception of Popper (1959) – would hold that empirical science is based
upon inductive inference (usually in combination with deductive inference). The
Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume (Hume, 2016) famously identified
the problem of finding a non-circular justification for inductive reasoning, known
as ‘the problem of induction’. Hume argued that inductive reasoning must always
assume that instances of which we have had no experience must resemble those of
which we have had experience. This in turn, according to Hume, relies upon the
principle of the uniformity of nature, according to which there is similarity or resem-
blance between observed and unobserved regularities in nature (Henderson, 2019).
Hume’s crucial observation was that in justifying such a principle we inevitably re-
quire further inductive reasoning. We are thus required to engage in a circular form
of reasoning in justifying induction via induction itself.
Within the vast literature on the problem of induction (Carnap, 1952; Braith-
waite, 1953; Goodman, 1983; Salmon, 1963; van Cleve, 1984; Sober, 1988; Papineau,
1992; Okasha, 2001; Norton, 2003; Okasha, 2005; Psillos, 2005; Bird, 2010; Douven,
2017; Henderson, 2019; Schurz, 2019) two lines of response will be of particular
relevance for our discussion. First, it has been pointed out (Sober, 1988; Norton,
2003; Okasha, 2001, 2005) that the assumption of a single principle of the unifor-
mity underlying all inductive inference is at odds with actual scientific practice. To
formulate a descriptively adequate argument, an inductive sceptic such as Hume
must recognise the diversity of uniformity principles at work in our inductive prac-
tices: for example, temporal uniformity (past phenomena resemble future phenom-
2Here we are taking ‘ampliative’ and ‘inductive’ to thus be synonymous. We mention both
terms here, despite their synonymy, since some authors utilise ‘inductive’ in a more narrow sense,
as referring to an ampliative inference of a particular form.
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ena), spatial uniformity (local phenomena resemble distant phenomena), intra-type
uniformity (these electrons resemble other electrons), and a huge variety of mixed
uniformity principles that are based upon combinations of the others (stars inside
our causal past resemble stars outside our causal past). It can then be argued that
this recognition of diversity in uniformity principles serves to convert the circularity
problem into a justificatory regress problem; since the various distinct uniformity
principles must themselves be justified. Now, whether or not converting the problem
from one of circularity to one of regress can be seen as a victory against the sceptic
is not at all clear (Schurz, 2019). However, what is undoubtedly the case is that
this line of response highlights the descriptive necessity of recognising the diversity
of uniformity principles that underlie inductive inferences in actual science.
The second line of response (van Cleve, 1984; Papineau, 1992) centres on the idea
that we can distinguish between two notions of circularity to dissolve Hume’s prob-
lem: ‘premise circularity’ and ‘rule circularity’ (Carnap, 1952; Braithwaite, 1953;
Psillos, 2005; Bird, 2010; Douven, 2017). Premise circularity (or begging the ques-
tion) occurs when the conclusion of an argument is explicitly listed amongst the
premises. Premise circular arguments are always viciously circular, in the sense
that putting forward a premise circular argument always involves making an infor-
mal fallacy of reasoning. Moreover, premise circular arguments are always dialecti-
cally ineffective in that they cannot be deployed to rationally convince an opponent
of the truth of their conclusion. If Hume had shown that any inductive justification
of induction were premise circular, then there would be a serious problem. How-
ever, so the counter-argument goes, in fact the justification of induction is properly
thought of as ‘rule circular’ rather than premise circular, and rule circularity is not
always vicious. Rule circularity arises when one employs an argument to establish a
proposition concerning a rule, such as its reliability, and the relevant argument-form
towards the proposition is an instance of that same rule. An argument for the reli-
ability of a given rule that essentially relies on the rule as an inferential principle is
not viciously circular, provided that the use of the rule does not guarantee a positive
conclusion about the rule’s reliability. That is, rule circular arguments towards the
reliability of a given rule do not constitute informal fallacies of reasoning (analogous
to begging the question) unless they make their own reliability a sure thing. We can
therefore see that rule circular inductive inferences cannot by definition be viciously
rule circular since, as ampliative inferences, they cannot guarantee a positive conclu-
sion about their own reliability. The crucial question is then whether the inductive
justification of induction is dialectically ineffective or not. That is, granted that it
cannot be viciously rule circular, there is still the question of whether an inductive
justification of induction can be deployed to rationally convince an opponent.
What is crucial here is the dialectical context. If a particular instance of success-
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ful inductive inference is used to justify a general mode of inductive inference of the
same form against a sceptical argument like Hume’s that is based upon a single uni-
formity principle, then the rule circularity undermines the dialectic force of such an
argument: it gives no reason for an inductive sceptic to change their mind regarding
the point at dispute. However, if a particular instance of inductive inference is em-
ployed within an argument to justify a second (non-identical) instance of inductive
inference, then the argument may well have dialectic force against an interlocutor
who is not sceptical of inductive reasoning per se.3 Consider the example of using
inductive arguments based upon the temporal uniformity of nature to justify rea-
soning based upon spatial uniformity: in the past, distant observed phenomena have
regularly resembled local observed phenomena, so in the future distant unobserved
phenomena will resemble local observed phenomena. Here one inductive inference
(based on, say, particular observations of spatial regularities) is reinforced by an
independently established inductive inference (in this case, temporal uniformity).
Or consider using inductive arguments based upon spatial uniformity to justify an
inductive argument for uniformity between different tokens of the same type: the
properties of observed spatially distant electrons resemble the properties of observed
local electrons, so all unobserved electrons will resemble observed electrons. Here,
again, one inductive inference (based on, say, particular observations of regular
properties across tokens of some type) is reinforced by an independently established
inductive inference (in this case, spatial uniformity). Clearly such arguments can
be, and often are, convincing.
Let us call such a style of reasoning inductive triangulation. As the name sug-
gests, this idea has much in common with the idea of ‘triangulation’ (Feigl, 1958)
that has been discussed in the context of the social and, particularly, the historical
sciences (Webb et al., 1966; Wylie, 2002; Chapman and Wylie, 2014; Currie, 2018).
Our usage is, however, somewhat more specific since it relates to distinct modes
of inductive reasoning, rather than simply distinct lines of evidence. Plausibly, if
inductive triangulation is deployed with the specific aim of defeating the inductive
sceptic then it allows one to avoid any dialectically problematic rule circularity.
However, once more, an obvious problem of infinite regress looms large: each link
in the chain of inductive inferences can be justified in a non-circular way, but it is
not clear how to terminate the regress of justificatory demands. Again, it is unclear
whether or not a response based upon rule circularity and inductive triangulation
3Our analysis of rule circularity and inductive reasoning is very similar in spirit to that given
by Carter and Pritchard (2017) in the context of a discussion of rule circularity and inference to the
best explanation. In particular, the potentially dialectically convincing example of a rule circular
inductive argument we are considering here is an instance of what they call a ‘wide’ rather than
‘narrow’ rule circular argument. On their analysis the former, but not the latter, have justificatory
structure that is not necessarily defective.
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improves the situation vis-a-vis the problem of inductive scepticism (Skyrms, 2000;
Schurz, 2019). However, what is clear is that there are convincing means by which
to justify novel forms of inductive reasoning against a sceptic who is not globally
sceptical of induction. That is, if inductive triangulation is deployed with the aim
of convincing someone to extend the licensed forms of inductive inference then there
is no dialectally problematic rule circularity.
The lesson is that, provided both parties to a dispute regarding the reliability of a
particular mode of inductive inference accept some form of inductive reasoning then
inductive triangulation is a legitimate (yet defeasible) means to establish justifica-
tion. An inductive justification of induction is not always dialectically problematic.
In a scientific context it is simply unreasonable not to admit any form of inductive
reasoning, and thus inductive triangulation is always an admissible argumentative
strategy. This leads us to define unreasonable doubt, in a scientific context, as doubt
regarding the reliability of a specific instance of inductive reasoning that cannot be
mitigated via further inductive reasoning, including inductive triangulation. We can
then define reasonable doubt, in a scientific context, as doubt regarding the reliabil-
ity of a specific instance of inductive reasoning that can be mitigated via further
inductive reasoning, including inductive triangulation.
2.2 Three Forms of Unobservable Phenomena
Once the spectre of unreasonable doubt has been clearly distinguished from its
reasonable counterpart, a constructive philosophical analysis of inductive practices in
science can be pursued in isolation from Hume’s problem. The question of particular
relevance is the relationship between the observed and the unobserved. In particular,
can we find strategies for inductive triangulation to validate such inferences. To pose
this question precisely we will require a number of further distinctions.
The first and most basic is between the data gleaned from a particular experiment
or observation and the general class of observable phenomena about which scientists
may reasonably draw conclusions, given the data. Consider the canonical exemplar
of Galileo’s observation of the phases of Venus: the data would be the particular
spots of light that Galileo saw through his telescope and the observable phenomena
would be the phases of Venus themselves. In principle both of these are observable
in the sense of visually accessible. In general, there being no need to privilege sight
above the other senses, we can think of observables as physical quantities whose value
can be directly discerned via the senses. The important difference here between data
and phenomena is that the data are idiosyncratic to a specific experimental context
but the phenomena are not (Bogen and Woodward, 1988). In the case we are
considering here, both the data and phenomena are observable but, while the data
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is actually observed, the observable phenomena are not. We can have reasonable
inductive doubts about both data and phenomena. What if Galileo’s telescope was
faulty? What if he had observed Venus in an atypical part of its orbit? In each case
such reasonable doubts are mitigated precisely by inductive triangulation: testing
the telescope on different celestial objects, re-observing the phases of Venus at a
different time of the year.
Whilst observable phenomena were often indeed the focus of Renaissance as-
tronomy, most of modern science is built upon inferences regarding unobservable
phenomena. In particular, as powerfully argued by Massimi (2007), building on
the original work on data and phenomena due to Bogen and Woodward (1988),
such unobservable phenomena are the subject of almost all experimental practice
in modern particle physics. The main focus of this section is to differentiate three
different types of unobservable phenomena (see Fig. 1). The first, and most ba-
sic, are unobservable phenomena that are manipulable. Consider another canonical
example: the Stern-Gerlach experiment. Here the data are spots on a particular
screen and the phenomenon is the spin of the electron – that is, the measurable
quantity corresponding to spin rather than the theoretical concept spin. This is
an unobservable phenomenon in the sense that it is not a physical quantity whose
value can be directly discerned via the senses. However, the spin of the electron
clearly is a physical quantity whose value can be indirectly discerned. Moreover,
although we cannot of course change the numerical value of the electron spin, it is
a vector quantity and via experimental apparatus like the Stern-Gerlach set-up we
can change the orientation of the spin. The manipulation of (tokens of) the rele-
vant unobservable phenomena is in turn an important part of the story about how,
again via inductive triangulation, we can mitigate reasonable doubts regarding the
inferences from experimental data to unobservable phenomena.
In general terms, unobservable phenomena that are manipulable (a) correspond
to phenomena to which we have ‘two way’ causal access. That is, we can probe the
phenomena via a suitable mediating system, and the phenomena can ‘push-back’ via
such a system. Whilst much of modern physical science does indeed focus on such
phenomena, it would be premature to terminate our analysis here. Rather, moving
beyond particle physics into the realm of astrophysics and cosmology it is obviously
the case that the unobservable phenomena of interest are unmanipulable. Usually
this is because they are very far away, happened a long time ago, or are simply
far too big. The phenomenon of a black hole merger as detected via gravitational
waves is perhaps the most vivid recent example of unobservable, unmanipulable
phenomena but it is not difficult to come up with a host of other examples.4 The
4Three further examples are: the internal structure and composition of the Earth’s core as
determined by measurements at the Earth’s surface of type P and S seismic waves; the existence
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story about how our inductive inferences about such phenomena are validated is
often a more complex one than in the case of manipulable phenomena. However,
it is noteworthy that, once more, scientists can and do employ a wider variety of
inductive triangulation strategies.
Unobservable, unmanipulable phenomena can themselves be further differenti-
ated on the basis of whether or not we have ‘one way’ causal access or not. That
is, whether or not such phenomena have discernible physical effects on observable
systems to which we have access. We thus have two further forms of unobservable
phenomena, those that are unmanipulable and accessible (b) and those that are un-
manipulable and inaccessible (c). Black hole mergers are accessible in the relevant
sense. Examples of phenomena that are inaccessible in principle, at least accord-
ing to current physics, include the physics of black holes behind the event horizon
and all physical phenomena outside our cosmological particle horizon (Davis and
Lineweaver, 2004). There are also, of course, examples of phenomena that are phys-
ically inaccessible in practice. The two examples that will be discussed in detail in
this paper are the photonic physics of stellar nucleosynthesis and Hawking radiation
associated with black hole event horizons. In such cases the relevant phenomena are
in principle accessible, however the relevant signal is vanishingly small and so, in
practice, according to current physics, we are never likely to be able to access them.
There is thus a strong time-dependence to the notion of ‘in practice’ inaccessibility
which introduces a degree of vagueness. Here we will use a working definition of in
practice inaccessible phenomena as phenomena that we have good physical reasons
to believe will remain inaccessible within the framework of contemporary science
and near future technology.
How can we ever expect to learn about in practice inaccessible phenomena
through observation or experiment? Would not inductive inferences regarding such
phenomena always be subject to a quite devastating and reasonable form of doubt?
How can we construct inductive triangulation procedures to mitigate such doubt?
Such questions will be taken up in Sections 3 and 4 in the context of the examples
of stellar nucleosynthesis and Hawking radiation. Before then we must provide a
final piece of philosophical machinery: an analysis of confirmation and evidence in
the context of contemporary experimental science.
of exoplanets as determined by measurements of radial velocity of stars with respect to the Earth;
and the value of the cosmological constant. In each case there is an unobservable, unmanipulable
phenomenon that can be experimentally quantified to a large degree independently of the relevant
theoretical interpretation regarding their nature. For an extensive discussion of the question of
the ‘authentication’ of empirical phenomena, and theoretical perspectives on the nature of such
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Figure 1: Diagram Illustrating the three forms of unobservable phenomena.
2.3 Experimental Evidence and External Validation
Our focus here is on the factors that influence the strength of support that experi-
mental evidence can offer a theory or model describing unobservable phenomena. In
all cases, what is crucial to the strength of the relevant inferences is an extrapolation
from a manipulated system that is the subject of the experiment (‘the source’) to a
further class of unmanipulated (but in some cases potentially manipulable) systems
that display the relevant unobservable phenomena (‘the target’). A simple example
is given by experiments designed to learn about the iron content in the core of the
Earth by superheating a sample of iron in a lab using lasers (Konoˆpkova´ et al., 2016;
Dobson, 2016). The experiments are carried out in the lab using samples of iron
that are placed in a laser-heated diamond-anvil cell. The pressure and temperature
to which the iron samples are subjected are specifically matched to those relevant to
the cores of Mercury-sized to Earth-sized planets. Iron in the core of Mercury-sized
to Earth-sized planets is the target, the iron in the lab is the source. Consider a
particular theory of geophysics set out in terms of the predicted phenomenon of the
thermal conductivity displayed by the iron in the core. In what circumstances can
we take evidence regarding thermal conductivity drawn from the experiment on the
source system to support a theory regarding the target phenomenon? And what
determines the strength of the support? Such questions are usually posed in terms
of the idea of external validation, which will be worthwhile discussing in some detail.
After a long period of relative neglect, the philosophy of experimental physics is
now the subject of an extensive literature (Hacking, 1983; Galison, 1987; Franklin,
1989; Franklin and Perovic, 2019). One of the most significant points established in
such discussions is that, in and of itself, an experiment need not teach us anything,
even about the system that is being directly manipulated. Rather, an experiment
is only genuinely probative of the system that is being experimented on when it has
been internally validated through the establishment of, for instance, the reliability
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of the apparatus and the robustness of the experimental protocol. Such a process of
internal validation can be understood precisely in terms of the idea of mitigation of
reasonable doubt discussed earlier. In practice many elements of the internal vali-
dation of an experiment take the form of explicit ‘auxiliary hypotheses’; statements
relating to instrumentation or other background assumptions that are needed to
support any inferences from the observational statements gained through the exper-
iment. Also significant is the role of more practical, sometimes tacit, experimental
knowledge in internal validation. Experimenters are embedded in a scientific tra-
dition that includes complex protocols for conducting a given experiment type in
a valid manner. Finally, in addition to auxiliary hypotheses and experimental tra-
dition, internal validation typically involves some consideration of statistical error.
That is, when the system being experimented on is assumed to be stochastic or
subject to random external fluctuations, experimenters need to establish that the
properties attributed to it are, to the relevant degree, typical of its stable state,
rather than statistical aberrations. For the most part this form of validation is very
difficult to achieve for a single system. Thus, multiple suitably similar systems are
experimented upon. In each case the strategies for achieving internal validation,
and thus mitigating reasonable doubt, are inductive. However, they need not in-
volve inductive triangulation. That is, the same form of inductive reasoning that is
involved in making inferences about the source system based upon the experimental
data might be used to internally validate the experiment itself.
External validation is then mitigation of reasonable doubt regarding whether the
source system is relevantly probative of the second, unmanipulated, target system
or class of systems. Similarly to internal validation, external validation involves a
combination of auxiliary statements, often from well-established scientific theory,
practical experimental knowledge, and statistical reasoning. However, unlike inter-
nal validation, in the case of external validation there is typically a requirement
for inductive triangulation at the heart of the mitigation of the relevant reasonable
doubt. The principal reason for this is that typically the source-target inference
requires an appeal to intra-type uniformity: the experiment on the source system is
taken to be relevantly probative of the target phenomena on the basis that they are
tokens of the same type of substance. By what means can one mitigate reasonable
doubt regarding the general pattern of such an inference? If one is confronted by
a sceptic regarding inductive inferences based upon intra-type uniformity, how can
one respond? In the context of such an opponent there is the obvious danger of rule
circularity of a dialectically undermining sort.
Consider for instance justifying an inference from particular iron atoms in the
source to iron atoms in the target based upon intra-type uniformity between the
relevant nucleons and electrons. The pattern of inference which we are seeking
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to justify is now itself involved in the justificatory argument. The argument thus
provides no dialectic force against the intra-type uniformity sceptic since its rule
circularity means the sceptic has been given no extra reason to change their mind.
The key point here is that, for the doubt to be reasonable in such circumstances,
our interlocutor must admit to some forms of inductive reasoning. Thus we can
mitigate general, reasonable doubt regarding intra-type uniformity in a dialectically
convincing way by invoking inductive inferences built upon spatial or temporal uni-
formity. These electrons resemble other electrons because there is an assumed spatial
uniformity between local phenomena and distant phenomena. This sample of iron
in the lab is like iron in the core of the Earth in the relevant respects because past
experiments and observations have been used to calibrate the relevant experimental
parameters.
It is important to note here that the manipulability and accessibility of the target
system does not in and of itself tell us anything about the limits to such external
validation processes. There is nothing in principle that tells us that external valida-
tion for manipulable target systems is easier to achieve for accessible target systems
nor, moreover, that such validation will even always be easier for accessible over
inaccessible systems. The degree to which reasonable doubt can be mitigated via
inductive triangulation depends upon contingent features specific to the experiment,
the source and target phenomena in question, and various theoretical and historical
circumstances.
We are now finally in a position to set out our stance regarding the limits of
experimental knowledge. We take it that such limits are set by the mitigation of
reasonable doubt – that is, the availability of inductive strategies for internally and
externally validating source-target inferences. When reasonable doubt has been par-
tially mitigated a theory can be said to be well supported, and a scientist is justified
to treat the empirical consequences of the theory as likely to be true, in the relevant
domain. Inductive triangulation may be required in such a mitigation process, but
it also may not. When reasonable doubt has been almost entirely mitigated a the-
ory can be said to be established, and a scientist is justified to treat the empirical
consequences of the theory as true, in the relevant domain. Plausibly, inductive
triangulation will always be required in such a mitigation process. In neither case
is the issue of inductive scepticism, and thus unreasonable doubt, relevant.5
5An outstanding problem for our analysis is the means by which the notions of a theory being
‘well supported’ and ‘established’ could be translated into probabilistic terms. In particular, it
would be very plausible to attempt to connect the relation of confirmation, as formalised prob-
abilistically within Bayesian confirmation theory, with the status of a theory as well supported
or established. Plausibly, well-supported theories are those in which updating from reasonable
priors based upon the evidence leads to a moderately high posterior probability (e.g. greater
than 0.5) and established theories are those in which updating from reasonable priors based upon
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Our notion of an established theory closely resembles what Dawid (2019) calls
‘conclusive confirmation’, which he defines as when a “theory has been established to
be [empirically] viable in a given regime beyond reasonable doubt” (p. 105). Whereas
Dawid leaves reasonable doubt undefined, we propose to explicitly define reasonable
doubt as doubt that is amenable to mitigation based upon inductive reasoning.
Reasonable doubt in this sense obviously specifically excludes inductive doubt, but
is also defined such that it excludes doubt based upon Cartesian scepticism or radical
social constructivism regarding experimental knowledge.6 Our point is not that such
doubts are unreasonable per se, but rather that they are unreasonable in the context
of an analysis of the epistemology of actual scientific practice, a context in which
the acceptance of at least some form of inductive reasoning is a methodological sine
qua non.7
As already noted, the manipulability and accessibility of some target phenom-
ena does not, on our view, in and of itself constrain the potential for the mitigation
of reasonable doubt, and thus the potential for a theory regarding the phenom-
ena to be well supported or established. In principle, it is thus perfectly possible
for theories regarding inaccessible phenomena to be taken to be well supported or
established based upon a suitably externally validated experiment and (where neces-
sary) inductive triangulation strategy. We thus endorse a liberal form of empiricism
within which the scope of phenomena about which we can gain experimental knowl-
edge is in principle much wider than that of either restricted forms of empiricism
(Van Fraassen, 1980; Monton and Mohler, 2017) or, moreover, ‘detectionist’ forms
of scientific realism (Azzouni, 2004; Chakravartty, 2007). Whether and how such
knowledge can be obtained in practice will be the focus of the remainder of the
paper.8
the evidence leads to a very high posterior probability (e.g. greater than 0.99). Unfortunately
such a straightforward translation immediately leads to well-known problems with the definition
of both reasonable priors (see e.g. (Salmon, 1990)) and suitable thresholds for “full belief” (see e.g.
(Buchak, 2014)). Such complexities do not block the explanatory value of our analysis for scientific
practice but would certainly need to be solved for the development of a fully fledged epistemology
of experiment.
6That at least some forms of social constructivism can be understood as unreasonable doubt is
evidenced by, for instance, the sentiment that: “a sufficiently determined critic can always find a
reason to dispute any alleged “result”” (MacKenzie, 1989). An instructive summary of the debates
regarding constructivism about experimental knowledge is given in §1.2 of (Franklin and Perovic,
2019). See also the excellent discussion of theory-laden experimentation due to Schindler (2013).
7There is thus some similarity between what we are proposing and the ‘response’ to Cartesian
scepticism deployed by epistemic contextualism (Rysiew, 2016).
8For an excellent discussion highlighting the problems with detectionist forms of realism in
the context of cosmological horizons and dark matter see (Allze´n, 2020). An example of a liberal
empiricism with interesting similarities to our own is that according to Hintikka’s remarkable
exegesis of Mach’s empiricism in terms of the econometricians notion of identifiability (Hintikka,
2001). An additional connection, which we hope to explore in future work, is between our notion
of inductive triangulation and Massimi’s idea that the deployment of a plurality of seemingly
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3 Case Study I: Stellar Nucleosynthesis
3.1 Evidence and Experiment
Our first case study chosen to help demarcate the limits of experimental knowledge
is the model of stellar nucleosynthesis – that is, the model of the nuclear reactions
that form the primary sources of energy production inside the core of a star. What
makes this case study particularly salient in the context of our discussion is that
it both involves all three forms of unobservable phenomena, (a)–(c), and a process
of external validation built upon inductive triangulation. Furthermore, the model
of stellar nucleosynthesis is supported by validated experimental evidence of such
quality and quantity that it is plausibly taken to be established. That is, relevant
reasonable doubts have been almost entirely mitigated, and thus scientists are justi-
fied to treat the empirical consequences of the theory as true, in the relevant domain.
Before we consider these epistemological claims in detail, let us consider the model
of stellar nucleosynthesis as described in contemporary physics.
For main sequence stars the model of stellar nucleosynthesis consists of two
principal reactions that take place in the stellar core: the proton-proton (pp) chain;
and the carbon-nitrogen-oxygen (CNO) cycle (Rose, 1998). In stars such as our Sun,
the pp chain is the dominant source of energy production, and transforms hydrogen,
via deuterium, into helium, with energy released in the form of gamma rays. Less
dominant in stars the size of our Sun (but becoming more dominant in larger stars),
the CNO cycle also transforms hydrogen into helium, but does so via a catalytic
process. In this process a carbon nucleus sequentially captures four protons. By
this capture process, and two associated weak nuclear decays, the carbon nucleus is
transformed to a nitrogen, and then an oxygen, nucleus before returning to carbon
after releasing a helium nucleus, with the release of energy in the form of gamma
rays at each step along the way.
The most significant feature of these processes for our purposes is that they
occur deep within the stellar core. The high energy photons that result from these
processes are released into the dense plasma of the stellar interior and so, due to
their strong interaction with matter, have a mean free path of about the order of a
centimetre. The origin of the stellar photons that we observe from the Earth then is
always the stellar surface layers and thus, with regard to photons at least, processes
going on within the interior of stars are in practice entirely inaccessible. Thus
obtaining direct photonic observational evidence for the nuclear processes at the
stellar core is simply not possible. As a result, these processes are unmanipulable,
and (photonically) inaccessible. We thus have an example of target phenomena from
incompatible models is methodologically crucial to the establishment of knowledge claims in the
context of contemporary particle physics (Massimi, 2018).
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the third most removed form of unobservable phenomena (c). Despite this, so we will
argue below, the model describing such phenomena is so well supported by externally
validated experimental evidence that there is little if any room for reasonable doubt.
Scientists are thus justified in treating the empirical consequences of the theory as
true in the relevant domain. Let us consider the various sources of experimental
evidence in turn.
To begin with, any possible source of stellar energy production is constrained by
two factors. Firstly, isotope abundances calculated from transition rates between
isotopes in any putative process of energy production are constrained by the isotope
abundances we observe in space, which themselves vary across ‘old’ and ‘new’ re-
gions of the universe, and between stars and interstellar space. Secondly, the rate of
reaction for any putative process of energy production is constrained by the inferred
core temperatures and lifetimes of stars of different masses. We can get a better
grasp on how these constraints restrict model possibilities by considering the role
that they played in the development of the first light-element nuclear transitions
proposed as the energy source of stars (Gamow, 1935, 1938). These proposals trans-
gressed against the constraints by either suggesting isotope abundances mismatched
to observation – in particular, interstellar abundances of lithium, beryllium, and he-
lium isotopes – or by containing reactions that are, based on known cross-sections,
too rapid or too slow to match inferred stellar lifetimes. In fact, any reaction that
involves the capture of protons by light elements will be too fast, and any reaction
that involves the capture of protons by heavy elements will be too slow.
The two key reactions we now take to comprise stellar nucleosynthesis in main
sequence stars, the pp chain (Bethe and Critchfield, 1938) and the CNO cycle (Bethe,
1939; von Weizsa¨cker, 1939), are much more promising candidates for stellar energy
production precisely because they have the right sort of reaction rates to match
inferred stellar lifetimes and produce no extra isotopes as by-products, other than the
hydrogen-to-helium transition, to match observed isotope abundances. Moreover,
terrestrial measurements of nuclear reaction cross-sections indicate that the CNO
cycle is highly temperature-sensitive, much more so than the pp chain, and for peak
efficiency requires temperatures higher than the core of stars such as our Sun. Thus,
for such stars, the pp chain is the main contributor to energy production, and the
CNO cycle gains precedence in much larger stars.
3.2 Inductive Triangulation
Let us consider the structure of the relevant inferences using the philosophical toolkit
we have developed above. As already noted, photonic phenomena relating to stellar
nucleosynthesis are unmanipulable and inaccessible. The observational and experi-
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mental evidence that we have thus described is only able to support the theory of
the phenomena based upon quite complicated modes of inference. For the first con-
straint, measurements of isotope abundances consist of the observation of spectra
from both stellar surfaces and in interstellar space, which are cross-referenced to
terrestrially observed spectra. We thus have two types of source phenomena: first,
phenomena of the stellar surfaces and phenomena in interstellar space, each of which
are accessible but not manipulable (b); and, second, the terrestrial atomic systems
that are experimented upon to measure their spectra (a). The inference from these
source systems to our target system, nuclear reactions in the stellar interior, is then
validated via a range of independently established theories. In particular, theories
relating to the origin of interstellar matter in both the explosion of stars via su-
pernovae and from the big bang and, moreover, the atomic structure of elements;
although it is worth noting that the two complementary theories of the origin of
interstellar matter are themselves partly justified by an empirically adequate model
of nucleosynthesis. It is of course hugely significant here that in such inferences we
must assume that the experiments to determine the spectra of terrestrial isotopes are
probative of stellar surface and interstellar isotopes. This is precisely the intra-type
uniformity assumption that we have discussed extensively already.
For the second constraint, stellar core temperatures and lifetimes are attained
from the inferred relationship between stellar mass and surface temperature owing
to the standard interpretation of the Hertzsprung-Russell (HR) diagram. The HR
diagram is a plot of observed luminosity against effective temperature and provides a
model of stellar evolution, which itself, as above, relies on assumptions about stellar
nucleosynthesis. Given the narrative of stellar evolution derived from the HR dia-
gram, observations of relative stellar luminosities in globular clusters, which contain
stars assumed to be all of the same age, can provide good estimates for the sorts of
time scales that stars of different masses live. These astronomical observations can
then be complemented with laboratory evidence (usually from particle accelerators)
for nuclear reaction rates and cross-sections to provide constraints on stellar core
temperatures and stellar lifetimes. These in turn place constraints on proposed nu-
clear reactions in the stellar core and thus the empirical viability of models of stellar
nucleosynthesis. Once more we have two types of ‘source’ phenomena: astrophysical
observations of phenomena that are accessible but not manipulable (b); and the ter-
restrial nuclear phenomena that are manipulated in particle accelerators (a). And
once more inferences from these source systems to our target system, the interior
of stars, is then validated via a range of independently established theories. It is
important to emphasise that at the heart of this chain of reasoning is the intra-type
uniformity assumption, as before, but also the spatial (and, by extension, temporal)
uniformity of the strong and weak nuclear force determining the nuclear reaction
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rates. In addition, there is a further appeal to temporal uniformity in assuming
that the observed stars are tokens of the same types as the stars in the past that
were the progenitors of the interstellar matter. It is precisely this use of multiple
independently justifiable lines of inductive support, mutually supporting the overall
inductive inference to the form of the nuclear reactions in the stellar interior, that
we call inductive triangulation. Without these uniformity principles, the inference
from the terrestrial to astrophysical phenomena could not be justified. Ultimately,
if these inferences are doubted, both of these lines of evidence can be called into
question. Thus, the non-rule-circular defence of the intra-type uniformity assump-
tion is an essential ‘backstop’ against the reasonable form of inductive scepticism
we have discussed earlier.
Together we take these two lines of evidence to be sufficient to categorise the
model of stellar nucleosynthesis as well supported. That is, given such evidence,
scientists are justified in treating the empirical consequences of the model as likely
to be true, in the relevant domain. There are, however, plausibly still reasons to
doubt the model, in part because of the level of background theory mediation and
the lack of empirical access to photonic phenomena in the interior of stars.
The final piece of evidence, that we take to establish the model as empirically
viable in its domain beyond reasonable doubt, involves a means of gaining access to
non-photonic phenomena in the interior of stars. However, once more, crucially this
evidence is only in fact able to support the model when combined with terrestrial
experiments, and so is naturally underpinned by uniformity principles. We have
made a point so far of the fact that obtaining direct photonic observational evidence
of the nuclear reactions in stellar cores is not possible. However, on account of the
fact that the neutrinos produced in the nuclear reactions in the stellar core interact
so weakly with matter, it is highly probable for them to escape the star without
interacting, allowing us to detect on Earth stellar neutrinos directly from the stel-
lar core. The neutrino flux from the reactions in the interior of the Sun can be
observed at Earth and compared to the theoretical value of neutrino flux deduced
from the theorised energy production process in the solar core. Fascinatingly, the
quantitative correspondence desired did not obtain when the first solar neutrino de-
tection experiments where conducted (Davis et al., 1968). Rather, it is only after
the hypothesis of neutrino oscillations that solar neutrino experiments sensitive to
the different neutrino flavours could be devised (Ahmad et al., 2001). With these
solar neutrino experiments, along with subsequent terrestrial neutrino experiments,
the predicted solar neutrino flux could be corrected and the correspondence between
observation and prediction obtained (Liccardo et al., 2018). Our story here is thus
partially modified from the above. In this case, the target phenomena are neutrino
reactions in the stellar core which are accessible but not manipulable (b). The source
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phenomena are solar and atmospheric neutrinos, as well as neutrinos in terrestrial
accelerators, that are manipulable (a) and have been established as displaying os-
cillation. Again, there is an appeal to intra-type uniformity – neutrinos on Earth
are like neutrinos in the stellar core in the relevant respects – and spatial uniformity
– the weak nuclear force is invariant under spatial translations – at the heart of
the reasoning. This provides a further independently justifiable line of inductive
support for the inference to the form of the nuclear reactions in the stellar interior,
in accordance with inductive triangulation.
In summary, the model of stellar nucleosynthesis provides an example of target
phenomena that are unmanipulable and inaccessible (c), the theory for which was
well supported before means of access via neutrino experiments were found. Plau-
sibly, it is this latter access that established the model as empirically viable in its
domain, beyond reasonable doubt. However, this evidence, like the earlier evidence,
relies crucially upon inferences from the terrestrial to the astrophysical grounded
upon inductive evidence for intra-type uniformity, supported by inductive triangu-
lation. Moreover, the realm of phenomena established for stellar nucleosynthesis
includes inaccessible target phenomena such as that relating to photons in the in-
terior of stars. This point is of particular significance in the context of black holes
and analogue experiments considered in the next section.
4 Case Study II: Hawking Radiation in Analogue Black Holes
4.1 The Argument for Confirmation
Hawking radiation (Hawking, 1975) is a thermal phenomenon that is predicted to
be generically associated with black holes. In practice, it is impossible to obtain di-
rect experimental evidence of Hawking radiation in astrophysical black holes. This
is because for astrophysical black holes the temperature is vastly smaller than the
cosmic microwave background, and so most likely outside the range of even the most
fantastically sensitive future telescopes. Despite the absence of any direct experi-
mental evidence, Hawking radiation is widely believed to be actual by theoretical
physicists on the basis that it is supported by various lines of theoretical argument.9
Not long after the original derivation of Hawking radiation, it was proposed
by Unruh that a similar thermal effect might exist in the context of sound in fluid
systems (Unruh, 1981). In particular, Unruh showed that the key elements of Hawk-
ing’s calculation could be re-applied in the context of a semi-classical model of sound
in fluids. An alternative medium for constructing acoustic black holes, that obeys
9A extensive summary of the various theoretical arguments is provided in (Wallace, 2018). See
(Gryb et al., 2019) for an overview of outstanding theoretical reasons to worry about the status of
Hawking radiation.
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equations of the same form as those of a fluid in an appropriate limit, is given by
a Bose-Einstein Condensate (BEC) (Garay et al., 2000). There are now a huge
number of potential analogue realisations of the Hawking effect: phonons in super-
fluid helium-3, ‘slow light’ in moving media, travelling refractive index interfaces
in nonlinear optical media, laser pulses in nonlinear dielectric media (Jacobson and
Volovik, 1998; Philbin et al., 2008; Belgiorno et al., 2010; Unruh and Schu¨tzhold,
2012; Liberati et al., 2012; Nguyen et al., 2015; Jacquet, 2018). Recent years have
seen a proliferation of experiments designed to probe the phenomenon of Hawking
radiation via analogue black hole systems. Reports on these experiments include
claims of the observation of classical, thermal aspects of Hawking radiation in an
analogue white hole created using surface water waves (Weinfurtner et al., 2011,
2013) and experiments leading to the observation of the quantum effect via the cor-
relation spectrum of entanglement across an acoustic horizon in a BEC (Steinhauer,
2016a; de Nova et al., 2019).10
In general, in analogue experiments we designate the ‘source’ phenomena as that
which is displayed by the type of physical system that is manipulated by the ex-
perimenter. The ‘target’ phenomena is then that which is displayed by the type of
physical system to which the ‘source’ system stands in analogy.11 In the case of an
analogue experiment on Hawking radiation, this means that the target phenomena
is Hawking radiation in astrophysical black holes. This is clearly an unobservable
phenomenon of the unmanipulable, inaccessible type (c). It has been claimed in
the literature that analogue experiments can in principle provide inductive support
for the theoretical models of such phenomena on the basis of external validation
via ‘universality arguments’ (Dardashti et al., 2017, 2019; The´bault, 2019).12 The
paradigmatic model of such arguments is the analysis of Unruh and Schu¨tzhold (Un-
ruh and Schu¨tzhold, 2005) who provide theoretical reasons to expect that, under
certain conditions, any modifications to the Hawking flux by high energy modes will
be negligible.13 Unruh and Schu¨tzhold show that a wide family of trans-Planckian
10For more on surface water wave experiments see (Rousseaux et al., 2008, 2010; Michel and
Parentani, 2014; Unruh, 2014; Euve´ et al., 2016; Torres et al., 2017; Euve´ et al., 2020). For further
results and discussion of Steinhauer’s BEC experiments see (Steinhauer, 2014, 2015; Finke et al.,
2016; Steinhauer, 2016b; de Nova et al., 2018; Leonhardt, 2018).
11This is the standard and well-established philosophical terminology for discussions of analog-
ical reasoning in science (Hesse, 1963; Bailer-Jones, 2009; Bartha, 2019).
12This account of ‘confirmation via analogue simulation’ draws heavily from the literature on
the philosophy of computer simulation, in particular the work of Winsberg (1999, 2009, 2010).
Subsequent analysis has included extensions in terms of formal frameworks for confirmation theory
(Dardashti et al., 2019; Feldbacher-Escamilla and Gebharter, 2020), further exploration of the
connection to conventional experiments and computer simulations (Boge, 2018) and a contestable
claim of there being a problematic circularity in the argument (Crowther et al., 2019). We will
return to this last point of controversy shortly. An excellent overview which includes discussion of
many relevant issues can be found in (Bartha, 2019, §5.1).
13For further work on these issues, using a range of different methodologies, see for example
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effects can be factored into the calculation of Hawking radiation via a non-trivial dis-
persion relation. To lowest order and given certain modelling assumptions, Hawking
radiation, both astrophysical and acoustic, is independent of the details of the under-
lying physics. A significant distinction that can be made in this context is between
robustness and universality (Batterman, 2000; Gryb et al., 2019). Robustness is the
insensitivity of a phenomenon under a token-level variation with respect to different
possible micro-physics in a single type of system. Universality is the insensitivity
of a phenomenon under a type-level variation between systems with fundamentally
different material constitution (e.g. BECs and a classical fluid). Given these defini-
tions, we can plausibly take the work of Unruh and Schu¨tzhold to be an argument
for both the robustness and the universality of the Hawking effect.
The argument for inductive support for the model of black hole Hawking radia-
tion based upon analogue experiments validated via universality arguments thus has
a very similar form to that for other inferences about inaccessible astrophysical phe-
nomena, such as the case study in §3. In particular, we have a reliance on a principle
of uniformity between a manipulable unobservable phenomenon in a source system
(analogue Hawking radiation) and an inaccessible unobservable phenomenon in a
target system (black hole Hawking radiation). Such an inference closely parallels
that between, for instance, nuclear processes in terrestrial particle accelerators and
in the interior of stars. In particular, with regard to photonic processes at least, the
interior of a star is inaccessible for precisely the same reason as the event horizon
of a black hole: in both cases the relevant flux of photons is vanishingly small. The
contrast is that whereas in more conventional experiments the source system is of
the same type as the target system, here the reliance is on the source being in the
same universality class as the target system. Thus, there is, prima facie, only a fun-
damental difference between the two forms of inference if one thinks that there is a
fundamental difference in kind between intra-type regularity principles, as embodied
by natural kind arguments, and inter-type regularities, as embodied by universality
arguments.
4.2 The Circularity Claim
It will now prove worthwhile to consider a recent attempt to undermine this ar-
gument for the inductive support of models of black hole Hawking radiation via
the combination of universality arguments and analogue experiments. In particu-
lar, Crowther et al. (2019) have claimed that to make such an argument one must
assume “the physical adequacy of the modelling framework used to describe the
(Corley, 1998; Himemoto and Tanaka, 2000; Barcelo´ et al., 2009; Coutant et al., 2012). For
discussion of the parallel trans-Planckian problem in analogue cosmology see (Cha¨ and Fischer,
2017).
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inaccessible target system” and that this implies that “arguments to the conclusion
that analogue experiments can yield confirmation for phenomena in [inaccessible]
target systems, such as Hawking radiation in black holes, beg the question” (p. 1).
As stated, it is a little difficult to know what to make of the argument of Crowther
et al. In particular, they talk about “begging the question” as the “inductive ana-
logue” of the deductive fallacy of the same name. At some points it appears that
they mean to indicate the premise circular version of circular reasoning since they
explicitly talk about the problem being that one “assume[s] the conclusion that [one]
is trying to establish” (p. 20). However, as we have seen already, as an ampliative
inference, inductive reasoning simply cannot be premise circular: all premise circular
arguments are non-ampliative by definition. Thus, it would be simply incoherent
to claim that an inductive argument for confirmation via analogue simulation is
premise circular when ‘premise circular’ is given its standard interpretation. An
argument simply cannot be both inductive and premise circular when each term is
standardly understood.
Is there a coherent sense in which we can construct an argument as both inductive
and ‘premise circular’ in some analogous but different sense to the standard definition
that ‘the conclusion is listed amongst the premises’? Let us consider what Crowther
et al. say explicitly to see if we can discern what they might mean by the ‘inductive
analogue’ of premise circularity. Consider the following statement in the context of
the informal arguments for confirmation via analogue simulation in the black hole
case provided by Dardashti et al. (2017) and The´bault (2019):
. . . by assuming that black holes are accurately described by the mod-
elling framework from which the derivation of Hawking radiation is a
necessary consequence, [Dardashti et al. and The´bault] already assume
the conclusion they are trying to establish—that Hawking radiation ex-
ists in black holes. It is in this sense that they are begging the question.
(p. 20)
Then, in the context of their analysis of the Bayesian argument towards confirmation
via analogue simulation due to Dardashti et al. (2019) they say:
. . . the circular dependence of conclusion on premise remains, as it must
still be presupposed that black holes are the kind of system that, with
at least some non-zero probability, exhibit certain physical behaviour,
which is precisely what one seeks to establish with analogue confirmation.
(p. 22)
We might thus plausibly interpret Crowther et al. to take that the ‘premise circu-
larity’ in question is that it must be assumed in the informal arguments that the
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semi-classical black hole modelling framework, including Hawking radiation, is ‘ad-
equate’ as a description of actual black holes or that, in the formal arguments, that
there is a non-zero probability that black holes exhibit Hawking radiation.
Given this interpretation, prima facie, it might appear that Crowther et al.
have identified a form of structural problem in the arguments in question that is
an inductive analogue of premise circularity. However, a little consideration of the
nature of inductive reasoning in general, and Bayesian reasoning in particular, shows
that this putative line of criticism either reduces to inductive scepticism or deductive
premise circularity. Inductive arguments are arguments towards a relation of non-
deductive inferential support between evidence and a hypothesis. They have the
general feature that the hypothesis must be assumed to be possible for them to
function – after all, this is what we standardly mean by ‘hypothesis’. Informally, if
one is certain that the hypothesis “all ravens are black” is false, since for instance
one has seen a white raven, then no matter how many black ravens one then sees,
one cannot take the hypothesis to be inductively supported. Formally, if we assign a
hypothesis regarding the empirical adequacy of a theory a prior probability of zero,
then no evidence can ever lead to confirmation in Bayesian terms since the posterior
probability will always remain zero under Bayesian conditioning.14
Assuming some minimal adequacy of the modelling framework as a description
of a target system, or a non-zero probability for the relevant hypothesis, is a nec-
essary pre-condition of all inductive reasoning. If that feature is what we should
understand as the inductive analogue of ‘premise circularity’, then Crowther et al.’s
argument immediately descends into a sceptical argument against inductive knowl-
edge in general based upon unreasonable doubt. Conversely, if the word ‘precisely’ is
taken literally in the second quote above, and the issue is understood to be that the
conclusion of the argument is identical to the proposition that ‘there is a non-zero
probability that black holes exhibit Hawking radiation’, then there would indeed be
premise circularity but only in the standard deductive sense of the term. And such
a reading is clearly implausible given that the entire discussion is framed by ideas of
confirmation and inductive evidence. We can thus conclude that there is no viable
way to parse the relevant notion of an ‘inductive analogue’ of premise circularity
14Explicitly, following (Dardashti and Hartmann, 2019), consider the propositions, T : “the
theory under-consideration is empirically adequate”; and E: “empirical evidence in favour of the
theory obtains”. Consider an agent with a prior probability distribution P over the propositional
variables T and E (with values T and ¬T and E and ¬E respectively). Bayesian updating implies
that the posterior probability distribution P ? for the probability of T is given by:
P ?(T ) = P (E|T )P (T )
P (E) . (1)
This means that if P (T ) = 0 then we necessarily have that P ?(T ) = 0 (or is ill-defined) and thus
confirmation is impossible.
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in coherent terms that avoids collapse into inductive scepticism and unreasonable
doubt.
A more promising reconstruction of Crowther et al.’s argument, and one with
which we expect them to agree, is available via reference to the idea of rule circularity.
The reconstruction would run as follows. In order to externally validate the inference
from source to target system via universality arguments, one must make inferences
based upon a uniformity principle of a novel kind: that is, inter-type uniformity
between accessible and inaccessible phenomena. However, it is the reliability of
precisely such a uniformity principle that is itself in question when we are trying to
ascertain external validity of analogue experiments. Hence there is indeed a form of
rule circularity implicit in the argument for confirmation via analogue simulation.
We take this to be the feature of the external validation of analogue experiments
that Crowther et al. find worrying.
Recall, however, that whether or not rule circularity is dialectically undermining
depends upon the context of the debate. If one is arguing with an inductive sceptic,
then appeal to inductive triangulation may enable one to convert the putative prob-
lem with rule circularity into one of justificatory regress. However, it is not clear
that this improves the anti-sceptic’s position in the argument: it is not clear that
they have provided any dialectically convincing response to the inductive sceptic.
On the other hand, since Crowther et al. are not assuming the position of inductive
sceptics, and so are not offering an argument based upon unreasonable doubt, they
surely cannot rule out strategies for inductive triangulation that lead to a termina-
tion of their justificatory demands. In particular, their explicit argument suggests
that they evidently do admit as unproblematic at least some inductive inference,
and thus the path is open for dialectically convincing mitigation of their reasonable
doubts via inductive triangulation.
4.3 Inductive Triangulation
Consistent between the various accounts of confirmation via analogue simulation
is the claim that we require a combination of multiple independent analogue ex-
periments to be successfully performed to support the case for black hole Hawking
radiation (Dardashti et al., 2017, 2019; The´bault, 2019). This is equivalent to an
enumerative mode of inductive reasoning between accessible systems of different
types. In performing multiple successful analogue experiments one is providing in-
ductive evidence for inter-type uniformity between different accessible phenomena.
Consider a hypothetical dialectic with a selective sceptic regarding inductive reason-
ing based upon inter-type uniformity. Assume such a sceptic admits the application
of enumerative induction. Then one can provide dialectically convincing evidence by
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demonstrating instances of successful inter-type uniformity: that is, experimentally
demonstrating some phenomena in one type of system, inferring that the phenom-
ena exist in a second type of system, and then demonstrating the phenomena in
the second system. There is nothing special about inter-type inductive reasoning
that bars inductive triangulation of the usual form. Furthermore, as Crowther et
al. themselves note, what counts as the same ‘type’ or ‘kind’ of system is to some
extent context dependent. Thus, a lot of intra-type reasoning in science might be
reinterpreted as inter-type reasoning in a given context (we would expect this to be
particularly true in the life sciences, and also in molecular and materials science).
Moreover, there exist examples of scientists using Wilsonian type universality argu-
ments to justify inter-type reasoning of this form in a range of condensed matter
contexts (Thouless, 1989; Pru¨fer et al., 2018; Erne et al., 2018; Eigen et al., 2018).
Thus inter-type inductive reasoning is in fact far more credible, and mundane, than
it might at first seem.
Let us then instead interpret the scepticism to be regarding the rule of inference
from accessible to inaccessible phenomena. That the ‘inaccessibility’ of the target
system is at the heart of Crowther et al.’s worry is indicated numerous times in the
paper. In particular, inaccessibility of the target system is referred to as both the
“key difference” between analogue and conventional experiments (p. 7) and, more-
over, the reason why analogue experiments in general are taken by Crowther et al.
to not be potentially confirmatory (p. 24). But here it is worth keeping in mind
our analysis of stellar nucleosynthesis above. Clearly there are inaccessible target
systems about which we can formulate theories and models that can be well sup-
ported by combinations of different lines of evidence. Inaccessibility of the target
system is thus not the key difference between analogue and conventional experiments
since conventional experiments can and do licence claims regarding inaccessible tar-
get phenomena. To exclude confirmation of inaccessible target systems in principle
would be to eliminate a variety of well-supported and established theories and mod-
els in contemporary physics. Furthermore, clearly if such a scepticism is voiced, it
can be mitigated in a dialectically convincing way via inductive triangulation based
on a vast array of successful scientific practices. Reliable inferences concerning con-
clusions about inaccessible target systems are commonplace in science and thus
there are abundant resources available to mitigate the concerns of a (reasonable)
sceptic regarding accessible to inaccessible inductive inferences in general. Finally,
it is worth noting that black holes are accessible when seen as classical systems since
empirical access to classical black hole phenomenology can be gained via the relevant
gravitational interactions. For example, between the 1970s and early 2000s, astro-
physical observations lead to the near unequivocal demonstration that the centre
of the Milky Way holds a supermassive black hole based on the motions of nearby
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orbiting stars (Genzel et al., 1997; Ghez et al., 2000; Curiel, 2019).15 Furthermore,
many of the key classical features of black holes, such as event horizons, are implied
by general relativity, which is extraordinarily well confirmed. So, in fact, the infer-
ence that we are considering is from an accessible and manipulable system to an
unmanipulable and partially inaccessible system. Structurally this is a similar form
of inference to that found in our stellar nucleosynthesis case.
This latter point is telling for the more speculative claim for which we argue in
this work; namely, that we take inductive triangulation to allow for the possibility of
analogue experiments to play a role, when combined with appropriate conventional
experimental results, in establishing new theories. In the stellar nucleosynthesis
case above, we saw explicitly how a theoretical framework characterising a set of
unmanipulable and partially inaccessible phenomena could come to be regarded as
established by the scientific community on account of a series of independent lines
of evidence employing independent inductive inferences (that is, by inductive tri-
angulation). We characterised the model of stellar nucleosynthesis as merely well
supported as a result of the ‘photonic’ evidence, from observed and calculated iso-
tope abundances and observed and inferred stellar luminosities and temperatures.
However, when combined with independent evidence from neutrino experiments we
take the model of stellar nucleosynthesis to be established. Granted, analogue ex-
periments showing Hawking radiation cannot by themselves establish astrophysical
Hawking radiation. But the inter-type inductive reasoning from source to target
employed by such experiments stands as a line of inductive inference that has the
potential to be combined with other independent lines made available by future
experiments, whether analogue or conventional, through the process of inductive
triangulation, to conceivably establish the relevant astrophysical theories. We take
the difference between the stellar nucleosynthesis case and the analogue black hole
case to be a difference in degree rather than a difference in kind.
One final option for interpreting the ‘circularity’ claim is that Crowther et al.
might take there to be an inferential problem specific to inferences based upon the
combination of inter-type and accessible-inaccessible uniformity. The idea might be
that there is some problem inherent to this combined inference that is not reducible
to either of its components. It is difficult, however, to see how the logic of such
reasoning would work. If it is permissible to reason separately from accessible to
inaccessible systems and from systems of one type to systems of another, then we
need some reason why it is not permissible, in principle, to reason from accessible
systems of one type to inaccessible systems of another type. So long as our inferences
15For further discussion of the fascinating methodological and epistemological problems asso-
ciated with observation of black holes in astronomy see (Collmar et al., 1998; Hehl et al., 1998;
Eckart et al., 2017). Thanks to Erik Curiel for advice on this literature.
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obey classical logic such concatenation must be accepted. Moreover, such a form
of sceptical argument would again seem liable to descent into inductive scepticism.
If concatenation of distinct forms of justified inductive reasoning were not itself
automatically justified, as is assumed in inductive triangulation, then it would not
be difficult to generate a justificatory regress, given the possibility to ‘fine grain’
principles of uniformity to an essentially infinite degree. Thus, again, there seems
no room for reasonable doubt.
The proceeding paragraphs have provided an exhaustive analysis of all plausi-
ble grounds for a structural inferential problem that might be termed ‘circularity’.
However, abandoning the circularity charge, a determined sceptic might wish to
put forward a specific scepticism regarding the universality arguments for Hawking
radiation in particular. Might these arguments not be uniquely problematic: ei-
ther since they are not suitably independent from the semi-classical models which
they are deployed to partially justify or have some other fundamental physical or
mathematical problems that make them implausible.16 First, it is true that many
of the same ingredients (e.g. calculating flux via Bogoliubov coefficients, or the as-
sumption of no back-reaction of quantum scalar field on classical spacetime) that
go into the Unurh-Schu¨tzhold universality arguments also went into the original
Hawking derivation. However, the two formal arguments also have significant differ-
ences. In particular, the universality argument is specifically about the breakdown
of the semi-classical regime within which the Hawking calculation works (this is
precisely what the modifications of the dispersion relation are designed to model).
Moreover, there are various families of other derivations of Hawking radiation, al-
most completely detached from the specific details of the universality arguments.
It is therefore difficult to argue that the two arguments are problematically inter-
dependent. Second, it is certainly the case that there are reasonable grounds for
scepticism regarding the universality arguments as they currently stand (Gryb et al.,
2019). However, it is important to note that the relation of inductive support be-
tween analogue experiments and astrophysical Hawking radiation only relies upon
the universality arguments having non-trivial (i.e. probability neither zero nor one)
credence (Dardashti et al., 2019). Whilst one could certainly justify setting a rela-
tively low credence, it is surely just as unreasonable to believe them to be certainly
false as it is to believe them to be certainly true. There are a number of indepen-
dently well-established general features that analogue black holes and astrophysical
black holes share, in particular event horizons and a continuum limit. Thus some
prima facie plausibility must surely be granted to the universality arguments. As-
signing a low credence in the universality arguments would mean that inductive
16Thanks to Grace Field for extensive discussions on each these points.
27
evidence from analogue experiments cannot render conclusions about astrophysical
black holes ‘well supported’, no matter how many such experiments are carried out.
However, such scepticism does not block the relation of inductive support per se. It
is thus difficult to resist the conclusion that, pace Crowther et al., analogue experi-
ments can in principle provide support for (and thus stand in confirmation relations
to) theories and models describing inaccessible target systems, like black holes.
In summary, to rule out inductive support for astrophysical Hawking radiation
based upon analogue experiments is unreasonable. However, for this support to
be strengthened, and reasonable doubts mitigated, both stronger universality argu-
ments and a new generation of analogue experiments showing Hawking radiation in
diverse media are needed.
5 Conclusion
The foregoing arguments and analysis notwithstanding, even if a wide range of
analogue experiments were successfully conducted and the relevant universality ar-
guments significantly strengthened, black hole Hawking radiation would certainly
not be something that is beyond reasonable doubt (or ‘conclusively confirmed’).17
The probative value of the next generation of analogue experiments in part depends
upon scientists’ ability to combine them with other analogue experiments and uni-
versality arguments to develop a stronger case of inductive triangulation. In this
context, it is worth noting that there are formal arguments (Dardashti et al., 2019)
which imply that the more certain we are about the adequacy of the analogue model
that describes the source system that we are experimenting on, the less effective is
the evidence obtained there in confirming the adequacy of the model of the target
system. We learn more about the target system by conducting future analogue ex-
periments using media about which we are less certain regarding their fundamental
physics. Thus, by strengthening the universality arguments, and testing them more
stringently across analogue platforms within which they may break down, we can
increase the inductive support for analogue Hawking radiation such that the rele-
vant theory might plausibly be taken to be well supported. Looking further to the
future, inductive triangulation allows for the possibility of analogue experiments to
play a role, when combined with appropriate conventional experimental results, in
establishing new theories.
17This is entirely consistent with the accounts provided in the literature (Dardashti et al., 2017,
2019; The´bault, 2019). It should be noted however, that a pre-print version of (The´bault, 2019)
(quoted by Crowther et al.) contains an unfortunate typographical error that has introduced
confusion on precisely this point.
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